# The complexity of the allocation problem in health care: can current decision rules provide a useful guide?

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#### Questions of fact and questions of value?



*Fact : k* = how much health displaced by increased HCS costs?*Value: v* = how much consumption should we give up for health?

- Specify a complete and legitimate SWF?
  - v is the measure of social welfare and presupposes a complete SWF
    - Health and consumption are the only arguments
    - or separable from other arguments
  - k is simply an inefficient nuisance preventing welfare maximisation
- Complete and legitimate specification of SW not possible?
  - Trade-offs still need to be and are made
  - Legitimate social process reveals something about a latent welfare function
  - Interpret shadow prices as revealed but partial expression of social value
    - k is a revealed expression of social value of health from collective health care
    - v is how much of their consumption individuals are willing to give up to improve their own health
  - So good reasons why  $k \neq v$
  - Good reasons to suppose there are other non separable arguments

## What it is and what its not



# A scientific question of fact

Martin et al 2008, 2009 and MRC/NIHR 2012

- Previously
  - Variations in expenditure and outcomes within programmes
  - Reflect what actually happens in the NHS by PBC

	Cancer	Circulation	Respiratory	Gastro-int
04/05 per LY	£13,137	£7,979		
05/06 per LY	£13,931	£8,426	£7,397	£18,999

- Need estimate the overall threshold:
  - How changes in overall expenditure gets allocated across all the programmes
  - How changes in mortality might translate into QALYs gained
  - More (all) programmes (types of QALYs displaced)
  - How uncertain is any overall estimate
  - How it changes with scale of expenditure change
  - How it changes over time

#### Budgetary policies and available actions

Chalabi et al 2008, and McKenna et al 2010

- Hard constraints with uncertain and variable costs and outcomes
  - Corner solutions or exogenous parameters
- Model budget, policy, information revealed and available actions
  - Current rules special case of soft constraint
  - No simple ex-ante rules more cost-effective if hard constraint
    - not meet budget at expectation or maximise expected health outcomes



## Implications for the value of research

Chalabi et al 2008, and McKenna et al 2010

- How much budget give up to resolve uncertainty?
  - Underestimate value (hard constraints and less available actions)
  - Overestimate (soft constraint)
- EVI based on current decision rules are a special case
  - Soft constraint and buy as much health as you like at a constant rate (k)
- Variability and uncertainty matters
  - Approval and research decisions



# Irrecoverable (opportunity) costs

McKenna and Claxton 2011 and MRC/NIHR 2011

- Irrecoverable per patient treatment costs (NHE profile)
- Irrecoverable costs allocated over time (e.g., capital costs of equipment)



## Irrecoverable (opportunity) costs

- Research is not possible with approval (incentives and ethics)
- Irrecoverable opportunity cost (value of information forgone)



Time for research to report, years

#### Where does this leave us?

- Cant fully specify SWF anyway
  - At best partial reflection of social value (cant claim efficient/optimal)
  - Contribute to accountable decisions and progressive change
- No 'optimal' simple ex-ante rules
  - Depends on budget, policy, what is revealed and when, and remedial actions available
  - Problem of second best (problem for traditional CBA as CEA)
  - Understand the limitations and implications
- Account for irrecoverable opportunity costs (price thresholds)
  - Reject to approve (only relevant if no uncerinty)
  - Reject to OIR, OIR to Approve (research not possible)
  - Reject to OIR, OIR to AWR, and AWR to Approve